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PRICE UNDER DIVERSE INFORMATION*
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We investigate the effects of diverse information on the price of
risky assets in rational expectation model. The expected cash flows
innovation is considered as private information where informed
trader knows it. It is assumed that the high informed trader has
smaller variance error regarding the cash flows innovation than the
low informed trader and uninformed traders. We found that the cash
flow innovation influences the demand of informed trader. The
market depth is a linear function of the demand of uninformed trader
and weighted average of total variance error of information. Our
finding supports previous research done by Spiegel and
Subrahmanyam (1992).
Our model shows that the more diverse the information, the
higher the lambda coefficient which means the market becomes less
liquid. The models consistent with Miller (1977) who found that the
bigger the gap of private information is, the less liquid the market
will be. If both informed traders have the same information they will
demand the same amount of risky asset and it turns out to be similar
as in the Kyle (1985) model.
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Introduction
The theory of financial markets
under homogeneous information has
generated a rich body of predictions,
extensively used in the financial in-
dustry. In contrast, the theory of capi-
tal markets under diverse information
has not been used much to guide asset
pricing and portfolio allocation deci-
sions. The goal of the paper is to ex-
plore the existence of equilibrium as-
set price under diverse information.
We consider the one period of Kyle
(1985, 1989) and Admati and Pfleiderer
(1987, 1988) model where there are
two informed traders posses diverse
information and uninformed trader in
the market. In another paper, Sartono
(2005) proved that optimum demand
of informed trader is a linear function
of the private information as measured
by the difference between the realiza-
tion value of risky asset and the current
price. Assuming that the information
cost is a function of investment size, he
found that the information acquisition
has an impact on the optimum demand
of informed trader.
It is evident that markets for infor-
mation, taking a variety of forms, are
important elements in financial mar-
ket. The questions are how does trad-
ing strategy depends on the precision
of information and is there an equilib-
rium asset price under diverse infor-
mation? Do informed traders be better
off than low informed traders or even
uninformed trader? We assume that
expectations about future prices influ-
ence the decisions of the traders and
hence the current price. Traders have
rational expectations about the link
between the current signals and the
current price, as in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980) and Admati
(1985). The setting assumption in our
model is a kind of game of incomplete
information. Informed traders have
signal or private information about
cash flows innovation and the value of
risky asset is determined by the ex-
pected cash flow innovations. Several
interesting papers have analyzed im-
plication of asymmetric or diverse in-
formation on the asset price (Kyle 1985
and Verrecchia 1982). Verrecchia
(1982) has feature that informed trad-
ers take equilibrium price as a given,
even though they influence the infor-
mation content of the price through
their traders. In this model, risk aver-
sion prevents prices from fully reveal-
ing the private information of the in-
formed traders. When the informed
traders observe strongly correlated sig-
nals, an increase in their number will
intensifies competition between them
and leading to an increase in market
liquidity.
Kyle (1985) started developing
the asset price under asymmetric in-
formation. He assumes there is one
risk-neutral insider or informed trader,
market makers, and noise traders. Kyle
proved that insider, as an informed
trader, makes a positive profit by ex-
ploiting his power monopoly optimally
in a dynamic context, where noise trad-
ing provides camouflage, which can-
cels his trading from market makers.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) extended
353
Sartono—The Existence of Equilibrium Asset Price under Diverse Information
the one-period Kyle model to a two-
period model and focused on the be-
havior of uninformed traders in an
attempt to minimize loss trading with
informed traders. Grossman (1976) and
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed
how the heterogeneous information of
different traders can be reflected on
the equilibrium price of security. Us-
ing two types of traders who are in-
formed and uninformed, they demon-
strated how the price system transmits
information from informed to unin-
formed traders. Nevertheless, if the
price system aggregates perfectly pri-
vate information, then it eliminates the
incentive for traders to collect infor-
mation.
Extending the Kyle’s model, Dia-
mond and Verrecchia (1981, 1987),
Jackson (1991), and Easley and O’Hara
(2001) analyzed the equilibrium, price
formation and the value of private in-
formation. He showed that if the price
formation process is modeled explic-
itly and traders are not price takers,
then it is possible to have equilibrium
with fully revealing prices and costly
information acquisition. Equilibrium
in costly information acquisition is ex
ante Pareto inefficient, since resources
are lost in the acquisition of informa-
tion. They proved that if the price
formation is explicit and traders influ-
ence the prices, then it is possible to
have fully revealing prices. Both in-
formed and low informed trade is who
observe diverse information or signals
as well as uniformed trades behave
strategically, taking into account the
effect of their demands on the market
clearing price. William (1977) intro-
duced an alternative model in pricing
capital assets under heterogeneous
beliefs and risk-aversion. He proved
that beta is no longer a complete mea-
sure of risk. Figlewski (1982) proved
that information level or diver infor-
mation affect investors’ beliefs or ex-
pectations. Thus, different investors
may acquire different information, pro-
cess it in different ways and respond
differently. In another study based on
a computer simulation model,
Schredelseker (1997) developed a
model that indicates that information
does have a negative value and does
not support the empirical evidence that
investors are willing to spend a lot of
money to get better information in
advance.
Model Setup
We would like to develop another
one period model similar to Kyle-
Admati-Pfleiderer model where there
are two informed traders who possess
diverse information and liquidity or
uninformed traders. The two risk neu-
tral informed traders have diverse pri-
vate information or signals about the
cash flow innovation in the end period.
The error of private information or
signals,      is independent and normally
distributed with mean zero.1 The in-
1 Greorg Nöldeke and T. Tröger (2001) strongly argued that the normality is not only sufficient
but also a necessary condition for the existence of linear equilibrium in the Kyle model. Mark
Bagnoli, S. Viswanathan and Craig Holden ( 2001) proved similar but less strong argument of
normality assumption.

i
~
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formed traders trade strategically and
submit a market order simultaneously
and independently to the market maker,
given their private signal to maximize
their expected profit. Moreover, no
trader is informed of the demand of
any other informed traders prior to
make his own decision. The demands
of uninformed traders are normally
distributed,                     , and we are not
able to learn anything from their de-
mand. In our model, the high informed
trader, x
h
 is assumed to have better
private information as indicated by
higher precision or smaller error than
the low informed trader, x
l
. The sub-
scripts “l” and “h” stand for the low
and high informed respectively. The
informed traders have access to di-
verse and independently distributed
(d.i.d) private information. Informed
traders know that uninformed traders
have to trade due to the liquidity need
or they trade based on noise as if it
were thought as information.2
In the simple case of two informed
traders, the high informed trader is
assumed not fully determine the price,
other wise, the low informed and unin-
formed traders would not willing to
trade with him. In a one-period setting,
the high and the low informed traders
have private information about 'cash
flow innovations’ of end period as 
1
 +

h
 and 
1
 + 
l
 respectively prior submit
the market order. We assume the liqui-
dation value of asset as follows:
(1)
where V is know to all traders at the
beginning of trading, and informed
traders know, 
i
  the cash flow innova-
tions random variable. The random
variable 
h
,..... 
l 
 are diverse and inde-
pendently distributed, having mean
zero and variance of high informed
and low informed traders are 2h, 
2
l
respectively. In our setting, the differ-
ent part of the private signal is the
variance, where the low informed
trader is assumed to have higher vari-
ance than the high informed one.3
We assume that the variance of
private signal is as  2l =  a  
2
h
  where
a > 1. All traders submit the market
order to the market makers. The mar-
ket makers provide better liquidity to
the market and they know the total
order flows but not part of it. As a
competitive profession, market mak-
ers are prevented from making profit.
They possibly lose from trading with
~
~
~
~ ~ ~
2 Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) develop a similar model to Kyle’s (1985) model in which
they use risk averse uninformed traders instead of risk neutral uninformed traders. In their model,
uninformed trade based on the risk sharing purposes, and they are called as hedgers.
3 Klaus Schredelseker and Mattias Bank have raised this idea. They show how to formulate the
hypothesis in a simple way. The informed traders have signal as 
l
= 
1
 + 
1
 and 
h
 = 
1
 + 
h
 for low
and high informed traders respectively. The random variable 
h
~N(0, 2
h
); 
1
~N(0, 2
1
) and 
1 
~
N(
1
, 2
1
). The expected value of private information is equal to the cash flows innovation in the
end period, E(
1
)= E(
h
)= 
1
. Let’s take the variance of private information of high and low informed
traders, Var (
1
)= Var (
1
) + Var (
l
)= 2
1
+ 2
1
 and  Var (
h
)= Var (
1
) + Var (
h
) = 2
1
+ 2
h
. We
assume that Var (
l
) = a Var (
h
), therefore, 2
1
= a2
h
.
~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~
~
~
V= v + 
i
~ ~ ~
~u
 
~
 
N(0,
 
2
u
)
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tion. The asset price is assumed to be
partially revealing and so it provides
incentive for information traders to
acquire costly information, otherwise
there would be no traders willing to
spend a single euro for any informa-
tion. The informed trader has diverse
information just before submitting the
order.
Lemma 1. Assumed that high informed
and low informed traders have diverse
information, the optimum demand of
the high informed and the low in-
formed traders are as follows:
and
Proof: We assume, the price is a linear
function of total order flow as:
We take a similar approach as in
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and
Spegel and Subrahmanyam (1992).
The high informed trader maximizes
his profit given his information and
expected private information of the
low informed trader. If the high in-
formed trader conjecture that the mar-
ket order of the low informed trader is

1
(
1
 + 
l
); the profit maximization of
the high informed trader, x
h
 is as Equa-
tion 3.
informed traders but make profit from
trading with uninformed traders. Fol-
lowing Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
approach, the market maker set the
asset price as linear function of total
order flow as follow:
where 
l

h
 In the equilibrium
E [V-P (y)|]= 0 condition must hold;
other wise, there will be an opportu-
nity to earn better return. Since the
informed traders hold diverse private
information, therefore, there must be
kind of Nash equilibrium under in-
complete information. The informa-
tion of other informed traders does
influence the decision of an informed
trader. The low informed trader knows
that he is trading against the high in-
formed trader, and uninformed traders
as well in the market.
The Optimum Demand of
Informed Traders
The setting assumption is a kind
of a strategic game of incomplete in-
formation; an informed trader holds
the correct expectation about the other
informed traders’ behavior and acts
rationally. In making decision, an in-
formed trader has to take into account
the expectation of other informed trader
given the private information. Each
informed trader has to move strategi-
cally, otherwise, he will not be able to
benefit from having private informa-
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
P [y |v +  (y)              (2)~ ~
P [y |v +  (y)
~ ~ ~
(    ) (        )1               213      2
1 
+ 2
1

1
=
(    ) (        )1               213      2
1 
+ 2
h

h 
=
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In the Nash equilibrium the x
h
must equal to 
1
 (
1
 + 
1
)and we know
that the Equation (4) represent the
optimum demand of the high informed
trader. We can rearrange, therefore, as
follows:
The low informed trader also
wants to maximize his profit, but he is
less aggressive than the high informed
trader. The low informed trader knows
that there is a trader who has better
information than him, but there are
liquidity or uninformed traders as well.
The profit maximization from the low
informed trader’s point of view can be
found using the similar approach, there-
fore the optimum demand of the low
informed trader is as follow:
As we assume that E[u]= 0 and the
private information is diverse, the ex-
We assume E[u]= 0 and random
variable, 
h
, 
1
 are independently dis-
tributed therefore, the expectation of

h

1
 is zero. If we take the first deriva-
tion with the respect of x
h
 and equating
to zero, we can solve for the optimum
order for high informed trader as Equa-
tion 4.
If we substitute the variance of
low informed trader with the variance
of high informed trader, 

2
l
=
 
a 

2
h
and
a> 1 we will see the impact of the
private information to the optimum
demand is as Equation 5.
~
~ ~
~ ~
x
h
=       (
1
 + 
l
)(       - l)
                                                 (5)

2


2
1


2
1
 + a

2
h
~ ~
~ ~
~
Max
x1 

 {x1(V - P(y)) |yh}~ ~ ~ ~
=Max
x1 

 {x1(v + 1- v - y) |yh}~ ~ ~ ~ ~
= Max
x1 

 {x1[1 - (x1 +h(1 + h) - u)]

| 


h}
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
(7)
= Max
x1 
(
1 
+
 

h
)
 
-
 
x
l 
(x
1
+
h
(
1 
+
 

h
))xl









h
~~ ~ ~
~ ~Max
xh
E{x
h
[
1
-(x
h
+
l 
(
1
+
 

l
) +
u)] |


l

~ ~
x
h


2
1


2
1
+
2
l
= Max
xh                              
(
1
+
1
)-x
h
(x
h
 +

1
(
1
 + 
1
))                                 (3)
~ ~
~ ~
Max
xh 
E{x
h
(V-P (y))| y


l

 Max
xh
E{x
h
(v+
1
-v-(y))| y


l

~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~
~
2x
h
=                  (
1
 + 
1
) -

1
(
1
 + 
1
)
x
h
=       (
1
 + 
l
)(       - l)
                                                 (4)
2
1
2
1
 + 2
1
~ ~
~ ~
2
1
2
1
 + 2
1
~ ~

2

l
(
1
 + 
l 
)=    (
1
 + 
1
)(               - 1 )









l

l 
  
l 
=     (              )











l

l 
= (    ) (              )









l
(6)
~ ~ ~ ~
357
Sartono—The Existence of Equilibrium Asset Price under Diverse Information
(10)
Equation (4) and (9) show the
optimum demand of the high informed
and low informed traders respectively.
It is obvious that the optimum demand
is a linear function of the volatility of
cash flow innovations and increasing
in the precession of private informa-
tion as measured by the error variance
private of information. The higher the
precession of information means the
smaller the error variance of informa-
tion. In the Nash equilibrium, the opti-
mum demand of the high informed
trader, as presented in the Equation
(10), is linear function of the variance
of cash flow innovations. The smaller
the error variance of private informa-
tion, 2
h
 the higher the demand will
be.
The similar plausible argument
can be applied for the low informed
trader. Equation (6) shows that the
demand of low informed trader is less
than the demand of high informed
trader as indicated that
 


2
l
= 
2
h 
and
a> 1. It is decreasing the function of
error variance of private information.
If then both informed traders have the
same information, they will demand
pectation of 
h

l
 is zero. If we take the
first derivation with the respect of and
equating to zero, we can solve for the
optimum order of the high informed
trader as follows:
If we substitute the variance of the
low informed trader with the variance
of the high informed trader,  ,
and a > 1 into Equation (8), we will see
the impact of the private information
to the optimum demand as follows:
(9)
The higher the coefficient ‘a’ is,
the lower the information level and the
smaller the demand of the low in-
formed trader will be. If a= 1 it means
that both informed traders have the
same information level and it leads to
i.i.d information scenario, following
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), in
the Nash equilibrium the x
h
 must equal
to 
l
(
1
 + 
l
), and x
1 
must equal to 
h
 (
1
+ 
h
), therefore we can solve the Equa-
tion (9) for beta as Equation 10.
~ ~ ~
~
~ ~
2x
1 

 
 (
1 
+
 

h
)
 
-
 

h
(
1 
+
 

h
)









h
~ ~ ~ ~
x
1

 



h
)( -
 

h
)









h
~~

(8)

h
 (
1
 + 
1
) 
 



h
)(  -
 

h
)~ 










h
~ ~ ~

h 
+  
 
()( )










h

h


h 

 
()( )









h
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the same amount of risky asset. So, the
higher the parameter “a” the smaller
the demand of low informed trader. It
means that the lower the information
level the smaller the demand will be;
the demand of the low informed trader
is a linear function of the volatility of
cash flow innovations.
Pricing Strategy
Let us now characterize equilib-
rium price trading behavior in the
model. Given the pricing rule in Equa-
tion (2), the demand of the high and
low informed traders is a linear func-
tion of random variables and normally
distributed. We assume that the de-
mand of uninformed traders are also
normally distributed and the expected
cash flows innovation, 
1
, conditional
on private information is linear. By
solving the linear Equations (2), (6)
and (10), we will find the lambda coef-
ficient. The following proposition pre-
sents the solution for the lambda coef-
ficient.
Preposition 1: Given the optimum
demand of the high informed and the
low informed trader, the market mak-
ers set the pricing strategy as follows:
where
and
Proof: Similar to previous analysis,
we know that the market depth which
is measured by the reciprocal of
lambda, refers to the ability of the
market to absorb quantity without hav-
ing a large impact on price. The lambda,
 is equal to the covariance of order
flow with the signal. In our setting, the
high informed trader has smaller error
than the low informed trader. Follow-
ing Kyle (1985) and Admati and
Pfleiderer’s (1988) approaches, if we
substitute Equation (6) and (10) into
the demand function then we can solve
for the lambda as follows:
(11)
To find out the covariance be-
tween the total order flows and cash
flow innovations, 
1
, the equation of
total order flow can be rearranged as
follows.
(12)
~
~


h 
+
 

l
)2
1



h



l
)


1


2
h


2
h


2
l


2
1



u
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Equation (12) shows that the mar-
ket depth is a linear function of the
volatility of cash flow innovations.
The higher the volatility of cash flows
innovations the bigger the market
depth. In the simple case with only two
informed traders, lambda is decreas-
ing in the variance of uninformed trader
and total variance of information er-
ror. The smaller the variance of infor-
mation error, it means the better the
private information and the bigger the
lambda will be. The finding is similar
to Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). How-
ever, if we have n informed traders
with diverse independently distributed
information, it would be complicated
and difficult to find a single-close form
solution because private information
has impact on the optimum demand. It
is an interesting issue for further re-
search.
Computer Simulation
In the previous part we have devel-
oped the mathematical model to cap-
ture the impact of diverse information
on asset prices. To test whether the
mathematical model is valid, we con-
duct a computer simulation. The com-
puter simulation is considered as the
easiest way to solve complex models
since we can simulate a model as many
as we need. Working with one period,
we assume there are only two informed
traders, uninformed traders and mar-
ket maker. The high and low informed
traders have private information about
the cash flow innovation of the end
period as                    and                   respectively.
The cash flow innovations are assumed
to be normally distributed,                              .
The error variance of private informa-
tion is                    where a>1, it means
that the low informed trader has a
higher error variance than the high
informed one. The demand of unin-
formed trader is normally distributed,
                   . The market maker sets
the price as a linear function of total
order flow to clear the market. In our
simulation, we design the error vari-
ance of high informed trader in the
range of 0.03 - 0.50. The coefficient a
is made within the range of 1.10 –
6.50; the volatility of cash flow inno-
vations were controlled within the
range of 0.10 – 0.90. The volatility of
uninformed traders were designed
within the range of 0.10 – 0.90.
Based on the optimization model,
we generate the necessary random vari-
ables and find the optimum demand of
both the high informed and low in-
formed trader. Our intention of having
a computer simulation is to see whether
our mathematical models are quite jus-
tifiable. We compare the results from
the mathematical model and from the
sample. A plausible model should be
able to generate result with only small
deviation compared to the simulation
results. The computer simulation is
conducted based on the second model
where the informed traders have di-
verse information. We do not simulate
the first model because informed trader
will demand equal amount of the risky
asset when they have identical and
independently distributed (i.i.d) infor-
mation.1 + h
~ ~ 
1 
+
 

l
~ ~

1
~N(
1
,2
l 
)
~
a
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The Simulation Procedure
and Results
We conduct simulations up to
1,000 times and in each case we use
1,000 transaction with the initial asset
price, p
0
= 10. The numbers of simula-
tions, transactions and initial price were
chosen arbitrary. We make several sce-
narios by controlling different random
variables. For example, the coefficient
of variance error of information, a is
designed to increase by different frac-
tions and we recorded nine different
results. Having the results we are able
to create a graph showing the beta of
the low informed trader, beta of the
high informed trader and a lambda
coefficient. The lambda refers to how
the market maker learns about the cash
flows innovation that determined the
asset price of the risky asset from the
order flows. In another scenario, we
assume that the variance error of the
high informed trader, the variance of
the uninformed trader and a are in-
creasing. The increasing error vari-
ance of informed trader and the coeffi-
cient of error variance of information,
means that the error variance of the
low informed trader increase as well
since                        . We expect that having
different graphs of informed traders’
demand and the lambda enable us to
draw further conclusions from our re-
search.
In general, our computer simula-
tions provide plausible results as it is
indicated by a very small difference
between the results based on the equa-
tion and based on the simulation. We
simulate the model into nine scenario.
In our first scenario, we assume that
the coefficient of variance error of in-
formation increases and the variance
error of the high informed trader,
decreases. Panel A-1 shows that the
demand of low informed trader de-
creases in the beginning and increases
thereafter.4 The decreasing demand
reaches the minimum level when the
variance error of low informed trader
and informed trader are the same.
Meanwhile the demand of the high
informed trader increases at an in-
creasing rate. It is due to the fact that he
has better private information then the
low informed traders. As a result the
high informed trader enjoys the ad-
vantage of having better private infor-
mation.
As we know that lambda mea-
sures how the market makers learn
about the cash flows innovation that
affect the asset price from the order
flows. The market depth is measure by
the reciprocal of lambda coefficient,
refers to the ability of the market to
absorb quantity without having a large
impact on prices. The smaller the
lambda is the more liquid the market.
The lambda increases at an increasing
4 The vertical axis of the graph indicates the demand of the high and low informed trader, and
the lambda. The horizontal axis represents the nine different simulations with the respect to the
different variables. For example, in Panel A-1, the error variance of high informed trader decreases
and the private information gap increases.
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rates, it means that the reciprocal of
lambda as a measure of market depth
decreases. Increasing the lambda indi-
cates that the change of order flow has
a greater impact on the price and the
market liquidity decrease.
It is plausible result because in
our first scenario as it is indicated in
Panel A-1, Panel A-2 and Panel A-3,
the error variance of private informa-
tion of high informed trader getting
smaller while the volatility of cash
flow innovation increases. At the same
time the error variance of low informed
trader rises, the high informed trader,
therefore, become a kind of informa-
tion monopolist. Another two similar
scenarios can be seen in the Panel A-2
and Panel A-3, where the high in-
formed trader enjoys the benefit of
having private information. Panel A-2
shows another scenario when the vola-
tility of uninformed trader and the co-
efficient of variance error increase.
The decreasing error variance of the
private information of high informed
trader means also smaller the error
variance of low informed trader. There-
fore, the demand of both informed
traders are increasing.
Now, let us take a look on the
Panel A-3, the demand of high in-
formed trader is a linear function of the
quality of private information, espe-
cially when the volatility of cash flow
innovation,    increases. This result
supports our hypothesis that the smaller
the variance error is, the bigger the
advantage of having private informa-
tion. Meanwhile the demand of the
low informed trader decreases to its
lowest level and increases subse-
quently.
We conduct another simulation
by changing the combination of ran-
dom variables. Panel B-1 shows that
when the volatility of cash flow inno-
vation and the coefficient variation
error of private information increase,
it means the variance error of the low
informed trader increases as well, the
demand of informed traders increase
at a decreasing rate. The demand of the
high informed trader, however, in-
creases at a higher rate than the de-
mand of low informed trader. It might
be due to the fact that the low informed
trader realizes that his information is
getting less accurate. The high in-
formed trader gains from having better
private information.
Panel B-2 shows another scenario
similar to the scenario in Panel B-1 but
the volatility of the uninformed trader
decreases. It indicates that the demand
of the low informed trader increases at
a decreasing rate. It is because the low
informed trader faces a bigger disad-
vantage relative to the high informed
trader. When the volatility of unin-
formed traders is constant and it pro-
vides an opportunity for low informed
to take advantage of having private
information. In all three cases, as in the
Panel B-1, Panel B-2, and Panel B-3,
the lambda increases, therefore the
reciprocal lambda decreases. The mar-
ket depth decreases at a decreasing
rate and as a result, the market liquid-
ity decreases as well. Similar to the
first scenario in Panel A, the change in
order flows has an impact on the price
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of risky asset. The market makers might
learn when the volatility of cash flow
innovation and the information gap
between high informed and low in-
formed traders become bigger, the or-
der flow is mostly come from the high
informed trader.
Now, let us take a look to the third
scenario of our simulation. Panel C-1
shows that when the volatility of the
uninformed trader, variance error of
high and low informed traders rise, the
demand of both informed traders de-
crease. The demand of the low in-
formed trader decreases at a higher
rate compared to the demand of the
high informed trader. It might be due
to the fact that both informed traders
face bigger uncertainty, the noise in-
creases and price becomes even less
efficient. But the demand decreasing
rate of the high informed trader is
smaller than the one of the low in-
formed trader. It means that the high
informed trader is able to extract the
advantage of having better private in-
formation than the low informed trader.
Panel C-2 shows when the volatility of
cash flow innovation, the error vari-
ance of private information and the
volatility of uninformed traders in-
crease, the demand of both informed
traders decrease. It is because the in-
formed traders have less precise pri-
vate information.
Panel C-3 indicates similar re-
sults, when the error variance of the
low informed trader and the volatility
of uninformed traders increase, the
decrease in the volatility of cash flow
innovation do not change much the
demand of informed traders. From all
Panel C-1, Panel C-2 and Panel C-3 we
find some thing in common that the
demand of informed traders decrease
due to the increasing variance error of
private information and the volatility
of uninformed traders. When the price
becomes noise or less efficient, the
low informed trader is not able to gain
from his private information as well
and the demand of informed trader
decreases. The lambda of the third
scenario is decreasing as well; as a
result, the reciprocal lambda increases.
It is in line with the pattern of the
demand of informed traders. The de-
creasing lambda means the market li-
quidity increase as measured by the
reciprocal lambda. We are not able to
find plausible arguments, however,
why the market liquidity increases
while the demand of informed traders
decrease. We expect that the higher
the liquidity of the market, the higher
the demand of risky asset and when the
market is liquid, the change in demand
has small effect on the price of the
risky asset.
We argue that the market liquidity
increase as a result of decreasing de-
mand of both high informed and low
informed traders. The simulation re-
sults indicate that the market liquidity
is inversely related to the demand of
informed traders. The changes demand
of informed traders has an impact on
the price of the risky asset. Based on
our nine scenarios, we are able to draw
some general conclusions on the im-
pact of random variable to the demand
of informed traders. If the volatility of
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cash flow innovations and the vari-
ance errors of the low informed trader
increase, the demand of informed trad-
ers increase at a decreasing rate. The
volatility of cash flow innovation does
influence the demand of informed trad-
ers and the volatility of uninformed
trader does not affect the demand of
high informed trader.
Limitations and Advantages
We simplified the Admati and
Pfleiderer (1988) model and take a
similar approach in Spiegel and
Subrahmanyam (1992) model. We as-
sume only two informed traders and
the high informed trader’s demand is
conditional upon the private informa-
tion of low informed trader. A low
informed trader conjectures the de-
mand of the high informed trader;
and this is a kind of a game under
incomplete information. So they have
to take into account their private infor-
mation. The problem is when we have
more than two informed traders, we
may find it is difficult and complex to
solve in a single closed form solution
because each informed trader has to
forecast all the other informed traders’
demand. This is due to each informed
trader has to forecast the other in-
formed traders’ private information.
We found that when the demand of
informed traders increases, the market
liquidity decreases. It means that the
demand changes affect the asset price.
Our result is consistent with Miller
(1977), when the gap of private infor-
mation between high and low in-
formed trader increases, the market
liquidity decreases.
In addition, unlike Spiegel and
Subrahmanyam (1992) who assume
that the uninformed traders are risk
averse, we assume that the uninformed
traders are exogenous and risk neutral.
The assumption is still debatable. Some
researcher may think that it is irratio-
nal and the irrational people must get
out of the market. We argue that it is
rational, because in the real world, a
trader does not know whether he is
better informed than the others traders
or not. Regardless the limitation of this
study, there is an advantage working
with a simple model. We expect that
our results will contribute to the issue
of asymmetric information and asset
pricing for n number of traders.
Conclusion
In this research we examine the
impact of diverse information on the
asset price. We simplified the Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988) model by using
two informed traders. The informed
traders have diverse private informa-
tion about cash flows innovation and
uninformed traders do not have pri-
vate information. We found that the
optimum demand of high informed
trader is higher than the optimum de-
mand of low informed trader given
other factor constant. The market depth
is a linear function of the demand of
uninformed trader and weighted aver-
age of total variance error of informa-
tion. Our findings support previous
research done by Spiegel and
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Subrahmanyam (1992). If both in-
formed traders have same information
they will demand the same amount of
risky asset and it turn out to be similar
as in Kyle (1985) model.
Our model shows that the more
diverse the information, the higher the
lambda coefficient, which means the
market become less liquid. The model
is consistent with Miller (1977) who
found that the smaller the gap of pri-
vate information, the more liquid the
market is. The model shows when the
error variance of private information
of high and low informed traders, vola-
tility of uninformed traders, and vola-
tility of cash flow innovation increase,
the market depth as well as the market
liquidity increase. This is due to the
fact that prices become less efficient
and the greater the value of private
information. In summary, the price of
the risky asset is a linear function of
the volatility of cash flow innovations,
and the precision of private informa-
tion which is measured by the recipro-
cal of the error variance. Our findings
may justify the argument that the higher
the volatility of cash flow innovations,
the bigger the adverse selection risk
and therefore, the lower the price of
the risky asset.
Recommendation
Our research opens some ques-
tion for further investigation. First we
do not model the information cost as a
linear function of investment size. We
assume that the high informed trader
will continuously collect the informa-
tion up to the marginal cost equal to the
marginal benefit of having additional
information. Second, we only work
with two informed traders who have
diverse information. Our computer
simulation shows that the higher the
information diversity or the gap be-
tween high and low informed trader
increase, the demand of both informed
traders decrease. It does not mean that
low informed traders who have less
accurate private information will de-
mand fewer risky assets. The unin-
formed traders need to be endogenous
and not necessary assumed to be risk
neutral. Those issues are open for fur-
ther research and need to be tested
empiricallly.
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